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 When does Regulation Bite? 
Co-Determination and the Nature of Employment Relations 
Abstract: The German Codetermination Law grants workers of establishments with 200 or 
more employees the right to have a works councillor fully exempted from his regular job 
while still being paid his regular salary. We analyze theoretically and empirically how this de 
jure right to paid leave of absence translates into practice and explicitly take into account the 
nature of the industrial relations participation regime. We find the right of exemption to make 
no difference in cooperative employment relations, but to develop its bite in adversarial rela-
tions, i.e. when – without legal enforcement – the legislator’s intent would not be realized. 
Introduction 
Codetermination in Germany and German works councils in particular have re-
ceived considerable attention in the industrial relations literature (see e.g. Jirjahn and 
Smith 2006, Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 2004). While much of the literature is 
concerned with measuring the effects of works councils (see e.g. Hübler and Jirjahn 
2003, Heywood and Jirjahn 2009, Hirsch, Schank and Schnabel 2010, Mueller 2011), 
recent analyses also aim at identifying the determinants of works councils being put 
into place (e.g. Jirjahn 2009, Mohrenweiser, Marginson and Backes-Gellner 2011). As 
the German Codetermination Law does not prescribe the establishment of works 
councils but rather leaves it to the initiative of employees to install this particular form 
of worker representation, it is not a priori clear whether in a specific firm falling under 
the Codetermination Law there will in fact be a works council or not. 
Similarly, it is not a priori clear whether works councillors will be exempted 
from their regular jobs or not. While the German Codetermination Law grants the right 
of exemption for a works councillor in companies with 200 or more employees, it is 
not clear whether this legal threshold does in fact translate into a factual one: Until 
recently, the literature typically assumed that, at the legal threshold, there would be an 
immediate “jump” from zero to one in the probability distribution of works councillors 
being exempted from their jobs (see e.g. Koller, Schnabel and Wagner 2008). How-
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 ever, as Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner (2010) show with the help of a new and 
unique data set, the distribution of works councillors being exempted from their regu-
lar jobs does not display a jump at the legal threshold.  
In this paper, we add to this new strand of literature on works councillor exemp-
tion by explicitly taking into account that, in practice, works councils are heterogene-
ous and that, as a result, the relationship between management and works councillors 
may either be cooperative or adversarial. Our analysis is motivated by the claim put 
forward by Jirjahn and Smith (2006, 650) that a “failure to distinguish among indus-
trial relations participation regimes characterized by cooperative or uncooperative rela-
tions between works councils and management” will lead to inconsistent and inconclu-
sive results. Hence, we analyze if the nature of the industrial relations participation 
regime does affect the probability of works councillor exemption and whether this ef-
fect varies between companies below and above the legal threshold. We develop our 
hypotheses on the incidence of works councillor exemption in cooperative versus un-
cooperative industrial relation participation regimes based on the seminal work by 
Freeman and Lazear (1995), but complement their analysis by explicitly taking into 
account the nature of the underlying industrial relation participation regime. We then 
present our empirical analysis using the works council data set of the Institute for 
Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (Bonn). Consistent with our theoretical hy-
potheses, our results show that in adversarial employment relations, the probability of 
works councillor exemption jumps at the legal threshold: it is zero below the legal 
threshold, then sharply rises at the legal threshold and afterwards increases with firm 
size. Conversely, in cooperative employment relations, we do not observe a “jump” at 
the legal threshold, but rather a continuous increase of the probability of exemption 
over the whole firm size distribution. 
While our analysis is concentrated on works councillor exemption, its implica-
tions go beyond this particular field of application: On the one hand, we find evidence 
for firms who voluntarily exempt works councillors from their regular jobs without 
legal obligation to do so. On the other hand, we find evidence for firms who do not 
exempt their works councillors in spite of a legal obligation to do so. For the former as 
well as for the latter, regulation apparently does not “bite”. Rather, the exemption of 
3 
 works councillors seems to depend on the nature of the industrial relations participa-
tion regime – with regulation only but reliably biting for those firms where employ-
ment relations are adversarial. For all other firms, the probability of works councillor 
exemption steadily increases in firm size – hinting at a general leverage effect rather 
than legal forces being at work in firms with cooperative employment relations. 
The plan of our article is as follows. First, we shortly characterize the legal 
background. Next, we derive our theoretical hypotheses on the probability of exemp-
tion in cooperative versus adversarial employment relations for companies below and 
above the legal threshold. In what follows, we present our empirical analysis. The last 
section concludes. 
Legal Background 
The German Codetermination Law states that works councillors practice their office 
gratuitously and as an honorary post (§37 I BetrVG). However, the employer is re-
quired to release the members of the works council from their job requirements while 
continuing to pay their salary „should it be necessary for proper fulfilment of their 
tasks when taking into consideration size and type of the establishment“ (§37 II 1 2.HS 
BetrVG). Specifically, paragraph 38 BetrVG subsequently substantiates that in estab-
lishments with more than 200 employees (legal threshold), at least one member of the 
works council is to be put on complete paid leave of absence.1 The number of works 
councillors to be put on paid leave of absence then rises in accordance with establish-
ment size. 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
In our theoretical analysis we bring together two very distinct research strands of lit-
erature dealing with works councils that have not been combined as yet: Freeman and 
Lazear’s (1995) economic theory of works council effects on the one hand and the so-
ciological, case-study based approach by Kotthoff (1981) identifying different types of 
works councils and employment relations on the other. Moreover, we enrich our theo-
retical model by taking into account firm size as a further potentially important deter-
minant of works council effects.  
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 In their theoretical analysis of works councils, Freeman and Lazear (1995) differ-
entiate between two potential works council effects: allocative effects on the one hand 
and distributive effects on the other. The allocative effects refer to works councils’ 
potential to enlarge the size of the “cake”, while the distributive effects refer to the size 
of the share of the cake that each party receives.  
Allocative effects have repeatedly been shown to exist (e.g. Hübler and Jirjahn 
2003, Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 2001, 2004) and might take the following 
forms: Works councils might be apt to enhance intra-company cooperation and com-
munication by improving the information flow from employees to management and 
vice versa. They might legitimize management decisions, optimize production and 
business processes and increase employee motivation, resulting in higher productivity 
and less fluctuation. Further, works councils’ information and co-determination rights 
might render management information more trustworthy and might help to articulate 
employee interests (Freeman and Lazear 1995, Mohrenweiser, Marginson and Backes-
Gellner 2011). 
At the same time distributive effects have also been repeatedly shown to exist 
(Hübler and Jirjahn 2003; Mueller 2011). Distributive effects of works councils’ ac-
tivities do not concern the size of the “cake” to be distributed but rather determine the 
share of the cake that goes to the workers or that is left over for the owners of the firm, 
respectively. The share going to the owners might be reduced by increased employee 
fringe benefits, pension funds, consumption on the job or the like and also as a result 
of direct costs of work council activities (e.g. office space, election costs etc.). Thus, 
although German works councils are not engaged in regular wage bargaining, there are 
other means by which they can actively influence rent distribution. 
However, while we know from the sociological case-study based literature (start-
ing with Kotthoff 1981) that in practice works councils are heterogeneous and indus-
trial relations participation regimes range from being cooperative to adversarial, the 
potential interrelation between industrial relations participation regimes and their allo-
cative and distributive effects has hardly been analyzed as yet. Rather, Freeman and 
Lazear model the extent of allocative and distributive effects to be the sole result of the 
range of rights given to works councils: While the allocative effects are argued to first 
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 increase and then decrease with an increasing range of co-determination rights (i.e. the 
relation between the range of rights given to a works council and a firm’s rent is as-
sumed to be hump-shaped), the distributive effects are assumed to monotonically in-
crease with an increasing range of co-determination rights.  
What Freeman and Lazear do not take into consideration is that works councils’ al-
locative and distributive effects will not only depend on the extent to which works 
councils are endowed with legal rights, but that they will also depend on the nature of 
the industrial relations participation regime. Further, Freeman and Lazear do not take 
into account firm size as a determinant of the allocative vs. distributive works council 
effects. In what follows, we regard both, the nature of the industrial relations participa-
tion regime and firm size as potential determinants of the allocative and distributive 
effects and discuss how the interrelation of these factors might impact the question 
whether works councillors are exempted from their regular jobs or not. This is our 
primary theoretical innovation. 
Concerning firstly the nature of employment relations, we differentiate between 
two basic “types” of industrial relations participation regimes: cooperative relations on 
the one hand and adversarial, conflict-oriented ones on the other. While in the former, 
works councils are assumed to concentrate on those activities that are apt to enlarge 
the size of the cake to be distributed (trusting that in the end they will also receive a 
fair share of what has been generated), in the latter, works councils will typically con-
centrate on securing a fair share of the firm’s rent before engaging in activities that 
might help to increase a rent that in the end will only be “eaten up” by the owners of 
the firm and will not be to the advantage of employees. Hence, we argue that in coop-
erative employment relations, works councils will typically concentrate on their allo-
cative role, whereas in conflict-laden, adversarial employment relations, they will 
rather focus on distributive goals.  
We further argue that exempting works councillors from their regular jobs (paid 
leave of absence), will put them in a position where they can devote more time and 
energy to their activities and will therefore be more able to reach their respective goals 
(whatever they are): Hence, in cooperative employment relations, works councillors 
that are released from their regular jobs will invest more heavily in their allocative role 
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 as they are more able to deal with information in depth and effectively practice their 
rights in order to contribute to the common goal. Those works councillors, however, 
who find themselves in conflict-laden employment relations will invest more heavily 
in their distributive role when being exempted from their regular job. 
Concerning, secondly, the effect of firm size on the allocative and distributive ef-
fects, it seems plausible to assume that the potential for allocative effects in a coopera-
tive environment increases with firm size: One reason for this is a typical leverage ef-
fect. The more people cooperate and work together towards a joint goal the larger will 
be the total effect. If only one employer and one employee increase their cooperation it 
will certainly have a positive effect, but if one employer and 100 or 1,000 employees 
increase cooperation, enhance communication and in the end work harder towards a 
joint goal, the total effect will be more pronounced and disproportionately higher. 
Hence, the allocative effects associated with the establishment of a works council can 
be expected to increase with firm size.  
So our question in this paper is to analyze how these different effects play together 
and how they help to explain why de jure rights of works councils are de facto not al-
ways used as granted. According to legal regulations, we have to distinguish two cases 
when it comes to the question if and when a works councillor is exempted from his 
regular job: (1) In firms with less than 200 employees, the question whether works 
councillors are granted paid leave from their job is left to the discretion of the em-
ployer. (2) In firms with 200 or more employees, the employer is legally required to 
exempt at least one member of the works council from his regular job while continuing 
to pay his salary. 
(I) Below the legal threshold of 200 employees where the firm can unilaterally de-
cide on whether to exempt a works councillor from his regular job or not, we expect to 
observe the following: 
- In adversarial employment relations, releasing a works councillor is not ad-
vantageous for the employer as the released works councillor will invest more 
in his distributive activities. Hence, firms will refrain from voluntarily ex-
empting works councillors from their regular jobs in adversarial employment 
relations.  
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 - In cooperative employment relations, however, firms expect increasing re-
turns with growing firm size if works councillors are granted paid leave of ab-
sence. The larger the firm, the larger is the effect of a works councillor who is 
able to concentrate on his activities and the higher are the returns due to in-
creasing allocative efficiency. Since in cooperative firms, the employer and 
the employees also find a cooperative way to share the rent, we expect that the 
larger the firm, the larger will be the probability that a works councillor is ex-
empted from his regular job. 
(II) Over and above the legal threshold of 200 employees, employees and works 
councillors are in a position where they may fight for their given right of exemption. 
Here we expect to observe the following: 
- In cooperative employment relations, the fact that works councillors are in a 
position to fight for their right of exemption does not make a difference be-
cause employers benefit from granting paid leave of absence with increasing 
firm size and will thus readily grant it above the threshold as well. Thus, in 
cooperative employment relations, we will observe a further smooth increase 
in the probability of exemption above the legal threshold. 
- In adversarial employment relations on the other hand, we expect the prob-
ability of works councillor exemption to increase dramatically after the 
threshold because even if the employer is not ready to exempt a works coun-
cillor from his regular job, works councils will be ready to enforce their claim 
as it helps them to get a larger share of whatever is at stake in the company (as 
once they are full time works councillors they are much more effective in 
achieving this objective). As fighting for one’s rights will still be costly, we 
do not expect the probability of exemption to jump to one instantly once the 
legal threshold is reached, but rather expect a gradual increase in firm size be-
cause the larger the firm in terms of employees the higher is the likelihood 
that additional rent shares will make up for the costs of such fights.  
This leads us to the following two hypotheses:  
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 Hypothesis 1: In adversarial employment relations, the probability of exemption (a) is 
zero below the legal threshold, (b) “jumps” at the legal threshold, and (c) further in-
creases with firm size above the legal threshold (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Probability of Exemption in Adversarial Employment Relations (H1) 
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Hypothesis 2: In cooperative employment relations, the probability of exemption (a) 
does not “jump” at the legal threshold, and (b) increases with firm size over the whole 
firm size distribution (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Probability of Exemption in Cooperative Employment Relations (H2) 
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 Empirics 
Data. We use the works council data set of the Institute for Small- and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises, Bonn. This cross sectional data set is based on a manager survey in estab-
lishments with between 20 and 500 employees dating from the year 2005 and is repre-
sentative for establishments of this size (for more details cf. Schlömer et al. 2007). The 
data set is ideal to test our hypotheses because of its detailed information on codeter-
mination and a large number of related managerial issues. Particularly, our data set 
contains information on the incidence of works councillors being exempted from their 
regular jobs and on the nature of the relationship between works council and manage-
ment. Given that we are interested in the determinants of paid leave of absence of 
works councillors but not on works councils per se, we restrict our data set to estab-
lishments with works councils leaving us with 231 establishments for which we have 
information of all the variables that we use in our regressions.  
Definition of Variables. Table 1 shows the definition of variables and the descriptive 
statistics for our dependent variable as well as our explanatory and control variables. 
As our dependent variable we use a dummy variable indicating whether at least 
one works councillor is fully exempted from his regular job (works councillor exemp-
tion).2 In our sample, in approximately 25% of the establishments there are works 
councillors who are fully exempted from their regular job. 
One of our important explanatory variables is whether the establishment under 
consideration is below or above the legal threshold (200+employees) above which 
paid leave of absence is granted by law. A little more than 43% of the establishments 
in the sample are above the legal threshold. In addition we use the metric variable 
lnsize to study size effects above and below the legal threshold.  
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 Table 1: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics (N=231). 
Variable Description (Mean, Std. Dev.) 
Works Councillor  
Exemption 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one works councillor is 
fully exempted from his regular job (0.247, 0.432). 
200+employees Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment employs more 
than 200 employees (0.432, 0.496). 
LnSize Log of the number of total employees in the establishment 
(4.973, 0.769). 
Bad Employment  
Relations 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if management views the relation-
ship with the works council as being very bad or bad (0.108, 
0.311). 
Skilled Employees Employees with a university or apprenticeship degree as a pro-
portion of total employees (0.776, 0.218). 
Apprentices Apprentices as a proportion of total employees (0.052, 0.072). 
Part-time Employees Part-time employees as a proportion of total employees (0.217, 
0.314). 
Female Employees Women as a proportion of total employees (0.349, 0.248). 
Employment Growth Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment experienced a 
positive employment growth during the last three years (0.281, 
0.451). 
Collective Agreement Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment is covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement (0.615, 0.488). 
Active Owner Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment is managed by 
an active owner (0.351, 0.478). 
Direct Participation Dummy variable equal to 1 if there are other direct forms of 
worker involvement in decision making (0.429, 0.496). 
Strong Support by  
Workforce 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the workforce strongly supports 
the works council (0.268, 0.444). 
Strong Union Influence Dummy variable equal to 1 if unions have strong influence on 
the works council (0.430, 0.497). 
Age of Works Council Time span between the survey year and the year the works 
council has been introduced (19.43, 16.38). 
East Germany Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment is located in 
East Germany (0.225, 0.419). 
Industry Dummies Industry dummies for manufacturing, construction, retail, logis-
tics & communication, services for companies, and services for 
privates  
The variable bad employment relations is based on the question “How would 
you describe the relation between management and works council in your establish-
ment” that had to be answered on a Likert scale from “1” (very bad) to “5” (very 
good). For the sake of our empirical analysis, we created a dummy variable “bad em-
ployment relations” for establishments answering “1” (very bad) or “2” (bad)”. In our 
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 sample, approximately 11% of the establishments consider their employment relations 
to be bad. With reference to our basic theoretical assumption that in bad employment 
relations, works councils concentrate on their distributive role and not so much on 
their allocative one, we find the following: Confronted with the item “The works 
council improves the quality of decisions” hinting at a substantial allocative role of 
works councils, only 4% of managers in establishments with bad employment rela-
tions fully agree or agree while more than 26% of managers in establishments with 
good employment relations fully agree or agree. In contrast, confronted with the item 
“The works council is a source of union strength” rather highlighting the distributive 
role of works councils, 48% of managers in establishments with bad employment rela-
tions fully agree while a comparative lower percentage of managers in establishments 
with good employment relations (28%) fully agree. The same is mirrored in the overall 
evaluation of works councils being either judged as detrimental or as beneficial: While 
52% of managers in establishments with bad relations judge their works councils to be 
detrimental, less than 2% of managers in establishments with good relations do so.  
We use a large number of further control variables, whose influence on works 
council incidence, attitude and effects (Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 1997; Jirjahn 
and Smith 2006) has been shown in the past (for variables used cf. Table 1).  
Probit estimates. In the following we analyse the determinants of works coun-
cillor exemption based on a series of probit models with the likelihood of works coun-
cillor exemption as the dependent variable and 200+employees and/or lnsize as ex-
planatory variables plus the additional control variables as presented in Table 1. We 
start with a regression for all firms to see whether there is a jump in paid leave of ab-
sence at the legal threshold (model I in Table 2). We next run separate regressions3 for 
firms with good employment relations (models II to IV in Table 2) and for firms with 
bad employment relations (Table 4).  
When we first look at model I in Table 2, we find that there is no jump in the like-
lihood for paid leave of absence of works councillors at the legal threshold (the coeffi-
cient of 200+employees is insignificant). So without taking into consideration our 
theoretical analysis suggesting to separate establishments with good and bad employ-
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 ment relations one finds the somewhat puzzling result that legal regulations do not 
seem to have an impact. 
Table 2: Determinants of Works Councillors Exemption – All Establishments and 
Establishments with Good Relations 
 All 
Firms 
Good  
Relations 
Good  
Relations 
Good  
Relations 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
0.248  0.539 6.969 200+employees 
(0.55)  (1.16) (1.27) 
LnSize 2.185*** 2.224*** 1.806*** 2.714*** 
 (4.26) (6.88) (3.73) (3.02) 
   -1.239 200+employees * 
LnSize    (1.17) 
-0.375    Bad Employment  
Relations (0.98)    
Apprentices -1.733 -1.394 -1.331 -1.404 
 (1.01) (0.76) (0.72) (0.74) 
Part-Time Employees 0.382 0.414 0.382 0.436 
 (0.88) (0.98) (0.91) (0.98) 
Female Employees -1.173* -1.698** -1.782** -1.920** 
 (1.78) (2.38) (2.44) (2.57) 
Employment Growth -0.295 -0.138 -0.166 -0.156 
 (0.99) (0.45) (0.55) (0.51) 
Collective Agreement 0.534* 0.548 0.554* 0.542* 
 (1.92) (1.85) (1.86) (1.78) 
Active Owner 0.083 0.106 0.035 0.023 
 (0.28) (0.35) (0.11) (0.07) 
Direct Participation 0.329 0.224 0.230 0.220 
 (1.18) (0.76) (0.78) (0.75) 
-0.348 -0.291 -0.328 -0.339 Strong Support by 
Workforce (1.16) (0.98) (1.11) (1.14) 
0.311 0.299 0.331 0.368 Strong Union Influence  
(1.12) (1.04) (1.15) (1.25) 
Age of Works Council 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.44) (0.26) (0.19) (0.27) 
East Germany 0.365 0.265 0.290 0.332 
 (1.15) (0.76) (0.83) (0.90) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -12.905*** -12.763*** -10.742*** -15.228*** 
 (4.46) (6.05) (3.95) (3.13) 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.47 
Observations 231 206 206 206 
Coefficients of a Probit ML estimation. Robust Z-statistics are in parentheses.  
*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%.  
Source IfM Bonn Works Council Survey 2005. 
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 In a next step, we therefore split the sample and run separate regressions. When we 
look at establishments with good employment relations (models II to IV in Table 2), 
we also find that the likelihood of works councillor exemption does not display a jump 
at the legal threshold (200+employees). This supports hypothesis 2a stating that in co-
operative employment relations we do not expect a “jump” at the legal threshold. We 
also find that the likelihood of paid leave of absence increases continuously with firm 
size (lnSize is significantly positive in models II, III and IV) and that it does not in-
crease stronger above than below the legal threshold (no significant coefficient of the 
interaction term between employees200+ and lnSize in model IV). This supports hy-
pothesis 2b stating that in cooperative employment relations, the probability of paid 
leave of absence increases with firm size over the whole firm size distribution. This 
result, which is clearly counterintuitive from the perspective of the legal regulation, 
supports our theoretical analysis. 
Concerning firms with bad employment relations, we first take a look at the de-
scriptive distribution of works councillor exemption for establishments with bad em-
ployment relations (cf Table 3). As can be seen, there is in fact no single establishment 
below the legal threshold that exempts at least one of their works councillors – al-
though about half of the establishments with bad employment relations are below the 
legal threshold. This clearly supports hypothesis 1a. 
Table 3: Establishments with Bad Relations and Works Councillor Exemption 
 Less than  
200 Employees 
More than  
200 Employees 
Total 
No Paid Leave  
of Absence 
13 5 18 
Paid Leave of Ab-
sence  
0 7 7 
Total 13 12 25 
Source IfM Bonn Works Council Survey. 
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 To test hypotheses 1b and 1c, we next run probit estimations with the likelihood 
of works councillor exemption as the dependent variable and lnsize as explanatory 
variable (see Table 4). The regression only contains the 12 firms above the legal 
threshold as there are no establishments with bad employment relations below the le-
gal threshold who exempt works councillors from their regular jobs. We find that the 
coefficient of lnSize is significantly positive. This supports hypothesis 1c stating that 
in adversarial employment relations, the probability of exemption increases with firm 
size above the legal threshold.  
Thus, taken together our results also support hypothesis 1b, i.e. that in adversar-
ial employment relations there is a “jump” at the legal threshold. Since the coefficient 
in Table 4 estimates the linear effect of firm size on the likelihood of paid leave of ab-
sence above the legal threshold and we know that below the legal threshold the likeli-
hood is always zero, the positive coefficient means that there is a kink in the likelihood 
of paid leave of absence at the legal threshold.  
Table 4: Determinants of Works Councillor Exemption – Establishments with Bad 
Relations 
LnSize 6.226** 
 (2.40) 
Constant -35.443** 
 (2.40) 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.46 
Observations 12 
Coefficients of a Probit ML estimation. Robust Z-statistics are in parentheses.  
*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%.  
Source IfM Bonn Works Council Survey 2005. 
To visualize our findings, we plot the likelihood of paid leave of absence by firm 
size (cf. Figure 3). Additionally, Figure 4 displays the proportion of establishments 
exempting works councillors from their regular jobs for all establishments (Panel A), 
for establishments with bad relations (Panel B) and for establishments with good rela-
tions (Panel C). 
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 Figure 3: Works Councillor Exemption – Predicted Probabilities 
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The predicted probabilities of works councillor exemption for establishments with good relations are predicted 
by using the estimated coefficients in column (III) of Table 2. The probabilities for establishments with bad 
relations are predicted using the estimated coefficients of Table 4. All of the other control variables are assumed 
to be at their mean level. N= 231.  
Source: IfM Bonn Works Council Survey. 
16 
 Figure 4: Proportion of Establishments Exempting Works Councillors 
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Panel b: ONLY ESTABLISHMENTS WITH BAD EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 
 
Panel c: ONLY ESTABLISHMENTS WITH GOOD EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 
 
Legal Threshold 
Legal Threshold 
Legal Threshold 
Panel a: all establishments (N=231),  
Panel b: establishments with bad employment relations (N=25)  
Panel c: establishments with good employment relations (N=206).  
Source: IfM Works Council survey 2005 
Robustness checks. To find out whether our result that there is no jump in the inci-
dence of works councillor exemption in establishments with good relations is robust to 
other specifications, we ran a number of robustness checks with alternative specifica-
tions for firms with good relations and used various alternatives to specify the shape of 
the effect that firm size may have (cf. Table 5). 
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 Table 5: Determinants of Works Councillor Exemption, Establishments with Good 
Relations – Robustness Checks. 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
200+employees  0.163   -0.068 2.087***
  (0.31)   (-0.13) (7.48) 
LnSize 23.301** 21.181*     
 (2.13) (1.76)     
LnSize squared / 1000 -1.925* -1.745     
 (-1.95) (-1.63)     
Firm Size   0.009*** 0.037*** 0.038***  
   (7.40) (4.73) (3.49)  
Firm Size squared / 1000    -0.051*** -0.053***  
    (-3.83) (-3.10)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.48 0.48 0.39 
Number of Observations 206 206 206 206 206 206 
We use the same control variables as in the regressions of Table 2 column (II) to (IV).  
Coefficients of a Probit ML estimation. Robust Z-statistics are in parentheses.  
*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%.  
Source IfM Bonn Works Council Survey 2005. 
In Table 2 model II, we used a linear firm size variable lnSize and found a significantly 
positive coefficient of firm size on works councillor exemption in establishments with 
good relations. In Table 5 model I, we add a quadratic term of firm size to see whether 
there are non-linearities. We find a significantly positive effect of firm size and firm 
size squared, i.e. the likelihood of works councillor exemption rises with firm size but 
at a decreasing rate. In Table 5 model II, we additionally add the legal threshold 
dummy to see whether firm size results change. We find that the legal threshold itself 
is again not significant and that the significantly positive effect of firm size remains. In 
Table 5 models III, IV, V, we use the absolute number of employees instead of the 
logarithm and find structurally the same results as in models I and II. In Table 5 model 
VI, we drop all but the legal threshold variable 200+employees, and only in this case 
we find a significant effect for the legal threshold dummy. However, this only catches 
the result of the steady increase found in previous estimations that is now split in two 
pieces: smaller firms with on average lower probability of exemption and larger firms 
with on average higher probability of exemption. Hence, above all this result shows 
how a misspecification of the model may suggest an effect of a legal threshold that is 
indeed only a statistical artefact.  
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 Taken together, our results provide strong support for our theoretical explana-
tion and hypotheses. However, our results cannot provide evidence for a causal effect 
because we do not have panel information and can therefore not rule out reverse cau-
sality. 
Conclusion 
The German Codetermination Law grants the right of paid leave of absence for 
a works councillor in establishments with 200 or more employees. In our paper, we 
add to the literature in showing that legal regulations not necessarily mean that granted 
rights are indeed used in reality. Specifically we show that the question whether code-
termination regulation will bite or not, depends on the nature of the industrial relations 
participation regime – with regulation primarily affecting those firms where employ-
ment relations are adversarial. In firms with cooperative employment relations, on the 
contrary, the probability of works councillor exemption steadily increases with firm 
size and remains unaffected by the legal threshold as such – hinting at a general lever-
age effect rather than legal forces being at work. 
In identifying the nature of the underlying industrial relations participation re-
gime as a basic determinant of works councillor exemption, our study supports the 
claim put forward by Jirjahn and Smith (2006, 650) concerning the potential failures 
associated with not differentiating between cooperative and uncooperative industrial 
relations participation regimes. Hence, large parts of the literature on works councils 
have to be revisited because the measured effects may be turned upside down if differ-
ent industrial relations participation regimes were recognized. While the previous lit-
erature did not have the chance to take account of different industrial relations regimes 
due to data limitations, our results show that this is not a minor issue and should be 
solved in the future by (a) theoretically distinguishing between different regimes and 
(b) by empirically taking account of different regimes, e.g. by systematically including 
questions on the nature of the underlying industrial relations participation regime in 
surveys.  
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1 The costs for a complete paid leave of absence of a works councillor at the threshold of 200 employees have 
been taxed by Schnabel and Wagner (2001) to be at 0,5 percent of total salaries. Friedrich and Hägele 
(1997) calculate a rise of direct works council costs from 98,000 Euros to 148,000 Euros per year on aver-
age when the threshold .was lowered from 300 to 200 employees.  
2 In addition to establishments with employees on “full” paid leave of absence there are also a few establish-
ments with employees being part-time on leave. Since such “part-time” leave may be very minor, and since 
we have no information on the number of leave hours and since part-time leave is not subject to the legal 
regulations we are interested in, we only include “full” paid leave as our dependent variable.  
3 Since below the threshold there are no establishments with bad relations that have paid leave of absence we 
cannot work with interaction terms but have to estimate our equations separately. Since there are also very 
few observations right around the threshold, we also cannot apply regression discontinuity models. 
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